

Message Text

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INFO CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 DACCA 1570

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, BG
SUBJ: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

A. U.S. INTERESTS

1. BANGLADESH'S IMPORTANCE IN THE WORLD, AND ITS INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES, STEM FROM ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION IN SOUTH ASIA AND ITS POSITION AS THE MOST POPULOUS OF THE TRULY POOR COUNTRIES. THE RELATIVE PROSPERITY OF THE PAST TWO YEARS, WHICH HAS PERMITTED THE COUNTRY TO BE A LITTLE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF MASS STARVATION AND A LITTLE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT, IS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED AS TENUOUS. IT IS DEPENDENT ON THE WEATHER AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, ON THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, NEITHER OF THESE ELEMENTS OVER WHICH THE US CAN HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE. NONETHELESS, IF THE UNITED STATES IS TO BE SEEN TO TAKE AN INTEREST IN THE ECONOMICALLY LESS DEVELOPED WORLD, IT CANNOT IGNORE THE 80 MILLION PEOPLE OF BANGLADESH -- THE POOREST OF THE WORLD'S
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LARGER NATIONS.

2. IN RECENT YEARS BANGLADESH HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT RECIPIENT OF MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE; THERE HAS BEEN ENOUGH EXPERIENCE WITH THIS KIND OF ASSISTANCE FOR US TO RECOGNIZE, NOT NECESSARILY PUBLICLY, THAT IT IS NO CURE-ALL. FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST NO LONGER A BASKET

CASE, BANGLADESH BY VIRTUE OF ITS HUGE POPULATION AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF ITS PROBLEMS WILL REMAIN A TEST CASE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RICH/POOR NATION RELATIONS. IF THE WEST IN GENERAL, AND THE US IN PARTICULAR, CANNOT HELP, THE ALTERNATIVE IS LIKELY TO BE CHAOS FOLLOWED BY SOME KIND OF BRUTAL TOTALITARIANISM. THIS PROCESS WOULD, MOST PROBABLY, RUIN ANY HOPES FOR STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA.

3. OUR OTHER INTERESTS ARE OF LESS IMPORTANCE. THERE IS A MARKET FOR US GOODS AND SERVICES WHICH WILL GROW IF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY GROWS. OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE GOOD; THERE IS LITTLE PERCEPTIBLE ANTI-AMERICANISM; WE CAN MAKE OUR RELATIONS CLOSER AND BETTER IF WE WANT TO. THERE IS A REAL LIMITATION ON HOW CLOSE WE SHOULD WANT THESE RELATIONS TO BE: WE HAVE NO IMMEDIATE STRATEGIC OR DEFENSE INTERESTS HERE, AND IT WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST FOR THE BANGLADESHIS OR ANYONE ELSE TO BECOME PERSUADED THAT WE DO HAVE SUCH CONCERNS.

4. IN SUM, THEREFORE, I SEE OUR OBJECTIVES IN BANGLADESH FALLING IN FOUR CATEGORIES: (1) MAINTENANCE AND FURTHERANCE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING CONSULAR; (2) STABILITY OF THIS COUNTRY IN THE SUBCONTINENT AND FORESTALLING ITS DOMINANCE BY ANY OUTSIDE POWER; (3) HUMANITARIAN CONCERN FOR A VERY POOR NATION; AND (4) OUR COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT TIES.

B. OVERVIEW
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5. BANGLADESH IS NOW 16 MONTHS FROM ITS LAST COUP (IN NOVEMBER 1975) WHICH PLACED MAJOR GENERAL ZIAUR RAHMAN IN THE LEADING POSITION. ZIA TIDIED UP THE LINES OF AUTHORITY TO SOME EXTENT IN NOVEMBER LAST YEAR WHEN HE BECAME CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR (CMLA), TAKING THAT POST FROM THE CIVILIAN PRESIDENT, WHO IS NOW LEFT WITH LITTLE MORE THAN THE CEREMONIAL FUNCTIONS AS HEAD OF STATE. (ZIA OPERATES IN INTERNATIONAL TERMS AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT.) THE REGIME HAS GAINED A FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL OF SUPPORT. THIS WAS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE LACK OF SERIOUS OPPOSITION TO (AND, INDEED, MUCH GENUINE APPROVAL FOR) ZIA'S DECISION TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD PROMISED TO HOLD IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR IN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN NOVEMBER 1975, WHEN HE TOOK POWER, AND WHICH WERE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY ZIA.

6. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN BANGLADESH FOR SOME TIME

TO COME AND THAT IN THE SHORTER RUN ITS LEADERSHIP
WILL BE THE HIGHEST DECISION-MAKING GROUP IN THE COUNTRY.
AT PRESENT, THE THREE SERVICE CHIEFS ARE MEMBERS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL (THE SURROGATE CABINET)
AND THE TWO OTHER THAN ZIA ARE HIS DEPUTIES IN THE
MARTIAL LAW REGIME. UNDER THE NOVEMBER 1976 REGULATIONS,
THE CMLA HAS ASSUMED TO HIMSELF VIRTUALLY COMPLETE
POWERS, AND THIS ARRANGEMENT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE
WHETHER OR NOT ZIA HIMSELF OCCUPIES THE CMLA POSITION.

7. A QUESTION BEING DEBATED CURRENTLY IS WHETHER ZIA
WILL ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY ITSELF, POSSIBLY THROUGH A
REFERENDUM BY THE RECENTLY ELECTED UNION COUNCILLORS
(THE AYUB PRECEDENT OF 1960 IN PAKISTAN IS THERE) OR
THROUGH A DIRECT ELECTION. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, HOWEVER,
WHETHER ZIA IS ONLY CMLA OR BOTH CMLA AND PRESIDENT
MAKES LITTLE DIFFERENCE: THE POWER IS IN HIS HANDS SO
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LONG AS HE AND THE MARTIAL REGIME REMAIN.
THIS APPEARS LIKELY FOR SOME TIME TO COME. (THE
ELIMINATION OF ZIA BY COUP OR ASSASSINATION IS ALWAYS
A POSSIBILITY; HOWEVER, THIS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO ALTER
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AS ZIA'S REPLACEMENT WOULD NO
DOUBT ASSUME THE SAME ROLE. IT IS NOT CERTAIN, OF
COURSE, THAT A REPLACEMENT WOULD BE AS EFFECTIVE OR
COULD MARSHAL THE SAME DEGREE OF POPULAR SUPPORT OR
WOULD MAINTAIN IDENTICAL DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL
POLICIES.)

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8. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN BANGLADESH IS THE BEST IT HAS BEEN SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1971, ALTHOUGH SOME INDICATORS (E.G., INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION) HAVE STILL NOT YET REACHED THE LEVELS OF THE LAST YEARS OF PAKISTANI RULE. THERE IS, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FOREIGN DONORS, SUFFICIENT FOOD. SIMILARLY, THE OTHER BASICS, SHELTER AND CLOTHING, ARE AVAILABLE IN INCREASING AMOUNTS, AND THE ECONOMY HAS BEEN STABILIZED, WITH INFLATION, WHICH EXCEEDED 50 PERCENT ANNUALLY AT THE END OF THE MUJIB PERIOD, SUCCESSFULLY STEMMED. THE PACE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY REMAINS UNSATISFACTORY, BUT DONORS AND THE BDG ARE ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS OF ACCELERATING THAT PACE. THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING STEPS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT. HOWEVER, THE MARGIN BETWEEN MALNUTRITION AND OUTRIGHT STARVATION IS SMALL; ANY ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT, OR MERELY A CONTINUATION OF UNCHECKED POPULATION GROWTH AT THE PRESENT 2.8 PERCENT ANNUAL RATE, COULD CHANGE THE PRESENT PROSPECT INTO THE KIND OF DISASTER WHICH HAS BEEN ALL TOO COMMON IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE SUBCONTINENT. THE LIKELIHOOD OF SERIOUS MAN-MADE PROBLEMS (SUCH AS A MAJOR DETERIORATION IN LAW AND ORDER) SEEMS LESS THAN, SAY, TWO OR THREE YEARS AGO. HOWEVER, CONFIDENTIAL

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THE HISTORICAL CYCLE OF NATURAL DISASTERS MAKES IT ALL TOO POSSIBLE THAT BANGLADESH WILL FACE ANOTHER TRYING TIME IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, WHICH WILL, AGAIN REQUIRE THE MOBILIZATION OF WORLD ASSISTANCE IN RELIEF OPERATIONS.

9. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO LABEL IT SUCH PUBLICLY, THE FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS OF BANGLADESH BEAR CLOSE RESEMBLANCE TO THOSE TAKEN BY PAKISTAN BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE LIBERATION OF THIS COUNTRY. THE REASON FOR THIS IS NOT HARD TO FIND. THE BASIC FEAR OF A HINDU RAJ WHICH LED TO THE EMAND FOR THE SEPARATION OF THE MUSLIM-MAJORITY AREAS OF INDIA IN 1947 IS AS PRESENT TODAY AS IT WAS THEN. WE CAN SEE, THEREFORE, A CONTINUATION OF THE CONCERN WITH INDIAN DOMINANCE OF THE SUBCONTINENT IN GENERAL AND OF THE ACRIMONY WHICH WILL ACCOMPANY SPECIFIC ISSUES OF WHICH FARAKKA IS THE HIGHEST ON THE LIST NOW. (TI SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE POPULAR DISTRUST OF INDIA PREDATES THE DOWNFALL OF THE "PRO-INDIAN" REGIME OF MUJIB AND IN FACT

CONTRIBUTED TO HIS OUSTER.) AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS A GROWING COMMUNITY OF INTEREST WITH PAKISTAN WITH A RESUMPTION OF TRADE TIES, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND TRAVEL. WE WOULD EXPECT THESE TIES TO GROW, BUT THIS WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY EFFORT HERE TOWARD REUNION. THAT IS OUT.

10. BANGLADESH IS OFFICIALLY NON-ALIGNED AND BELONGS TO THE GROUPINGS WHICH THAT TERM ENCOMPASSES. THIS CAN AND DOES LEAD TO ITS TAKING POSITIONS WHICH ARE AT ODDS WITH OUR OWN ON SOME ISSUES. NONETHELESS, RELATIONS BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND THE US ARE CLOSE AND FRIENDLY; WE EXPECT THEM TO CONTINUE ON THIS PATH, ALTHOUGH THERE WILL BE THIRD-WORLD AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ON WHICH WE WILL DISAGREE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT SOME BANGLADESH EXPECTATIONS OF THE US WILL NOT MATERIALIZE AND THAT THIS WILL CREATE
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DISAPPOINTMENT.

11. RELATIONS WITH CHINA HAVE GROWN IN THE POST-MUJIB PERIOD AND WE EXPECT THEM TO EXPAND, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS OF ECONOMIC/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PROBABLY IN MILITARY SUPPLY. IN GENERAL, BANGLADESH-CHINESE RELATIONS SO FAR ARE NOT CONTRARY TO OUR INTERESTS. BANGLADESH OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT BOTH THE US AND CHINA ABSTAIN FROM INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS, AN ATTRIBUTE THEY DO NOT ASCRIBE TO EITHER INDIA OR THE SOVIET UNION. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE AT A LOW EBB AND ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. BANGLADESH WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MORE CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS BUT, GIVEN EVENTS DURING THE MUJIB PERIOD, ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS. SOVIET HAMHANDEDNESS IN REFUSING TO CARRY OUT CONTRACTS PREVIOUSLY MADE OR DELAYING THEM HAS ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THEIR PRESENT LOW STANDING. NONETHELESS, THERE IS A VERY ACTIVE SOVIET CULTURAL AND INFORMATION PROGRAM HERE, WHICH APPEALS TO A FAIRLY LARGE SEGMENT OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA, AND WHICH, WITH OUR PRESENT DEPLORABLY LOW RESOURCES, WE ARE UNABLE TO COUNTERACT.

12. MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING RELATIONS: WE MAINTAIN IN BANGLADESH AN AUSTERE MISSION WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE TO THE LESS THAN CORDIAL RELATIONS OF THE MUJIB PERIOD, BUT WHICH IS INADEQUATE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH ARE AVAILABLE TO US NOW IN THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND WHICH WE FORESEE WILL CONTINUE AT LEAST THROUGH FY-79, AS NOTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO EXPAND SIGNIFICANTLY OUR INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS (IT

IS TO BE NOTED THAT EAST PAKISTAN AS A PROVINCE RECEIVED MORE ATTENTION IN THESE AREAS THAN BANGLADESH DOES AS A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY). THE EMBASSY HAS RECOMMENDED, CU HAS APPROVED AND USIA IS CONSIDERING A MODEST PROGRAM
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EXPANSION DVR USIS DURING THE REMAINDER OF FY-77 AND IN FY-78. WE MUST LOOK FOR FURTHER INCREASES IN SUCCEEDING FISCAL YEARS IF WE ARE TO REBUILD THE NOW AGIN GROUP OF AMERICAN-TRAINED AND TRAVELLED MEMBERS OF THE ELITE OF THIS COUNTRY.

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13. WE HAVE NOTED ABOVE THAT THE MILITARY IS CERTAIN TO BE A PART OF THE GOVERNING ELITE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE HAVE, DURING THIS FISCAL YEAR, INITIATED A SMALL IMET PROGRAM (\$50,000) WHICH IS TO BE EXPANDED TO \$200,000 DURING FY-78. THE FEW SENIOR BANGLADESHI OFFICERS WHO RECEIVED TRAINING AS MEMBERS OF THE PAKISTAN MILITARY WILL SOON BE OUT OF THE SERVICE. WE SHOULD EXPAND THIS PROGRAM FURTHER. THE ASSIGNMENT OF A U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE HAS BEEN APPROVED. THIS WILL BE A WELCOME ADDITION TO PERMIT US TO MAINTAIN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THIS IMPORTANT SEGMENT. IN SUM, WE ARE BARELY ABLE TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF MAINTAINING CLOSE RELATIONS WITHIN THE STAFF LIMITATIONS IMPOSED

ON THE EMBASSY.

14. STABILITY IN BANGLADESH AND REGION. THERE HAS BEEN, AND WE EXPECT TO SEE A CONTINUATION OF, STABILITY IN BANGLADESH. WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED IN CONSIDERABLE MEASURE TO THIS THROUGH OUR ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS. THESE HAVE CONCENTRATED, ONCE THE IMMEDIATE POST-INDEPENDENCE HUMANITARIAN WORK WAS COMPLETED, ON AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS. MORE COULD BE DONE IN THESE AREAS AND IN IMPORTANT RELATED
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AREAS SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRA-STRUCTURE AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, IN MANAGEMENT TRAINING. BANGLADESH COULD USE BUT CANNOT NOW ABSORB ADDITIONAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN AID COMMITMENTS AND AID DISBURSEMENTS IS SERIOUS AND IS VERY MUCH RELATED TO THE LACK OF MANAGERIAL CAPABILITY IN THE COUNTRY.

15. BEYOND PROVIDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, THERE IS NOT MUCH WE CAN DO TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILITY OF THE REGION. THERE HAS SINCE 1971 BEEN A CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT TOWARD A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ARMED HOSTILITIES WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THAT TIME ARE UNLIKELY TO OCCUR AGAIN. NONETHELESS, IT IS IN OUR LARGER INTEREST NOT TO TAKE SIDES IN REGIONAL ISSUES OF WHICH TWO CURRENTLY ARE OF IMPORTANCE HERE: THE GANGES WATERS DIVERSION AND THE ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY INDIA TO BANGLADESHI INSURGENTS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IN A BROADER FRAME AND OVER A LONGER TIME WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE BOTH INDIA AND BANGLADESH, THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY SUCH AS THE WORLD BANK, TO WORK TOGETHER IN HARNESSING AND UTILIZING THE VAST WATER RESOURCES OF THE COMBINED BRAHMAPUTRA-GANGES SYSTEM, TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL PEOPLE IN THE EASTERN SUBCONTINENT.

16. BANGLADESH IS CONCERNED OVER DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION (AND INDIA) IN THE COUNTRY. WE CAN HELP THEM COUNTER THIS TO SOME EXTENT AND STRENGTHEN INTERNAL STABILITY BY INCREASING OUR INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS AND BY EXTENDING MILITARY TRAINING FACILITIES TO BANGLADESH. WE MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER PROVISION OF LIMITED NON-LETHAL MILITARY ITEMS (RESEARCH EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT). WE ARE MOVING AHEAD OF THE FIRST TWO ITEMS BY WORKING FOR AN EXPANSION OF CU/NEA USIS PROGRAMS WITH CONCURRENT MODEST EXPANSION OF USIS
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STAFF AND FACILITIES AS WELL AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE.

17. HUMANITARIAN. THE US HAS BEEN THE LARGEST DONOR OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO BANGLADESH. AS NOTED EARLIER, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN DISASTER RELIEF AGAIN IF NECESSARY. IN BROADER TERMS, WE ARE UTILIZING OUR AID PROGRAMS EFFECTIVELY TO HELP CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH HUMAN SUFFERING WILL BE LESS

COMMONPLACE.

18. COMMERCIAL. TO THE EXTENT IMPORT AND EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES OCCUR WE HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE WITH OUR CURRENT STRENGTH IN GAINING US ACCESS TO THE MARKETS. MORE COULD BE DONE IF EXIM AND OPIC WERE TO OPERATE HERE. BANGLADESH HAS ACCEPTED ITS OBLIGATION TO PAY PRE-INDEPENDENCE DEBTS AND NATIONALIZATION CLAIMS. WITH SOME FURTHER SPECIFIC ACTIONS BY THE BDG, WE BELIEVE BOTH EXIM AND OPIC SHOULD REMOVE IMPEDIMENTS TO ASSISTING US EXPORTERS AND INVESTORS. ALREADY US BUSINESSMEN FIND THEMSELVES AT A DISADVANTAGE COMPARED WITH THOSE FROM SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES.

19. CONSULAR.
THE EMBASSY IS HANDICAPPED BY THE
DIVISION OF WORK IN THE CONSULAR SECTION BETWEEN TWO PART-TIME OFFICERS, EACH OF WHOM IS COMMITTED TO TWO HALF-DAYS IN THE SECTION, BUT EACH OF WHOM, TO THE DETRIMENT OF HIS REGULAR WORK, MUST BE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST AMERICANS AND BANGLADESHIS AT OTHER TIMES. THE WORKLOAD IS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE ASSIGNMENT OF A FULL-TIME CONSULAR OFFICER HERE. THIS WOULD HELP COUNTER PARTIALLY JUSTIFIED CRITICISM BY AMERICAN CITIZENS.

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C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES

20. BILATERAL RELATIONS.

(A) MAINTAIN AND EXPAND THE ALREADY GOOD RELATIONS WHICH EXIST WITH THE POST-MUJIB GOVERNMENT. SEEK BANGLADESHI SUPPORT ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. EXPAND THE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH THE US IN COMMERCIAL, CULTURAL, INFOR-

MATIONAL, AND ACADEMIC ENDEAVORS. RESPOND TO BANGLADESHI
INTEREST MILITARY TRAINING AND POSSIBLY IN LIMITED

NON-LETHAL MILITARY SUPPLY.

(B) COURSES OF ACTION

(1) MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH BANGLADESH OFFICIALS
AND PRIVATE CITIZENS IN EXPLAINING AMERICAN POSITIONS
AND SOLICITING THEIR SUPPORT. THIS ENCOMPASSES CONTACT
BY ALL SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY WITH BDG
OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF USIS RESOURCES WITH THE PUBLIC.

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(2) ENCOURAGE BANGLADESH TO USE ITS RESOURCES
PRIMARILY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHILE RECOGNIZING
ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

(3) THROUGH THE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED MILITARY
TRAINING PROGRAM SEEK TO ORIENT BANGLADESHI MILITARY
THINKING TOWARD THE WEST, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE
U.K. AND AUSTRALIA.

(4) CONTINUE OUR AID PROGRMS IN THE AGRICULTURAL,
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FAMILY PLANNING AREAS, BUT CONSIDER
EXTENSION OF THIS TO (A) RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
WHICH WILL IMPROVE DELIVERY OF INPUTS AND MARKETING
OF PRODUCTS AND (B) MIDDLE MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS
SUCH AS THOSE AIDED BY THE US IN THE PAKISTAN ERA.
IN DESIGNING THESE PROJECTS MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF
REPROGRAMMING EXISTING USAID POSITIONS AND OF TDY AND

CONTRACT PERSONNEL TO AVOID AN INCREASE IN THE DIRECT
HIRE AMERICAN STAFF.

(5) EXPAND OUR CULTURAL AND INFORMATION PROGRAM,
WITH EMPHASIS ON INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE
PROGRAMS, INCLUDING AMERICAN LECTURERS AND PROFESSORS
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HERE AND ADVANCED STUDY PROGRAMS FOR ACADEMICS AND NEWS
MEDIA SPECIALISTS IN THE US.

(6) LOOKING TO THE RESOLUTION OF DEBT PROBLEMS
WHICH PRECLUDE OPIC AND EXIM OPERATIONS NOW, WORK TOWARD
THE EXPANSION OF US TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN BANGLADESH
WITH THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THESE US AGENCIES.

(7) IMPROVE OUR CONSULAR SERVICES BY THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A FULL-TIME CONSULAR OFFICER POSITION.

21. REGIONAL RELATIONS

(A) ENCOURAGE BANGLADESH TO PURSUE A FOREIGN POLICY
WHICH IS REALISTIC IN TERMS OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
AND ITS RESOURCES. IN THE LONGER RUN, LOOK TOWARD,
AND ASSIST IF THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF, INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITH NEIGHBORS, ESPECIALLY
INDIA, WHICH WILL AID THE MATERIAL PROGRESS OF
BANGLADESH, SPECIFICALLY IN THE AREA OF WATER DEVELOPMENT.

(B) COURSES OF ACTION

(1) ENCOURAGE BANGLADESH TO BE REALISTIC IN ITS
RELATIONS WITH INDIA, NOTING THAT THIS ALSO REQUIRES
THE ENCOURAGEMENT IN INDIA OF A MORE FORTHCOMING AND
UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDE.

(2) ENCOURAGE BANGLADESH TO WORK CLOSELY WITH
OTHER NATIONS OF THE REGION AND TO WIDEN CONTACTS IN AID,
CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITHOUT, HOWEVER,
AROUSING INDIAN CONCERNS THAT SUCH RELATIONSHIPS, E.G.
WITH CHINA OR PAKISTAN, POSE A THREAT TO LEGITIMATE
INDIAN INTERESTS.

(3) IMPROVE THE NONE TOO STRONG COORDINATION IN
DACCA AMONG AID DONORS AND CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH
THE AID-TO-BANGLADESH CONSORTIUM.
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22. HUMANITARIAN

(A) NOW THAT THE IMMEDIATE DANGER OF STARVATION
MAY BE PAST, WORK WITH THE BANGLADESHIS AND OTHER
DONORS TO CREATE A SYSTEM IN WHICH THE DANGERS OF
MAN-MADE AND NATURAL DISASTERS CAN BE ALLEVIATED.

(B) COURSES OF ACTION

(1) IN FOOD AND TOER ASSISTANCE PLACE A STRONG
EMPHASIS ON SELF-HELP PROVISIONS WORKING TOWARD SELF-
SUFFICIENCY.

(2) ENCOURAGE BANGLADESH TO DEVELOP A PLAN
WHICH WILL HAVE ATTAINABLE GOALS IN FOOD PRODUCTION
AND FAMILY LIMITATION.

(3) CONTINUE PL-480 AS REQUIRED FOR FOOD NEEDS
IN KEEPING WITH PROGRASS TOWARDS SELF-SUFFICIENCY GOALS.
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